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ABSTRACT 
We consider the effects of voluntary international environmental protocols on emissions with 
regard to the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo Protocol on the reduction of sulphur 
oxides. Our analysis utilizes panel data from 30 European countries for the period 1960–2002. 
We divide these countries into “participants” and “non-participants”, i.e., those that did and those 
that did not ratify the specific protocol. We use a difference-in-difference estimator that focuses 
on the difference in emissions before and after signing a specific protocol and compares it with 
this difference for non-participant countries. Difference-in-difference estimation methods rely on 
annual data and may induce serial correlations in the variables. We use randomly generated 
placebo protocols to test the estimated effects. In a panel data regression model, where we include 
country and year dummies, the effect of the Helsinki agreement in reducing sulphur emissions is 
around three per cent per year, and the effect of the Oslo agreement is around four per cent per 
year. Correcting the standard errors for serial correlation in both dependent and independent 
variables is important and overlooked in the previous empirical literature on the evaluation of 
international agreements. 
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1. Introduction 
Success in managing global public goods and commons is important for our future 
welfare. Examples of global public goods include global warming, maintenance of 
international macroeconomic stability, international trade rules, international political 
stability, humanitarian assistance, and knowledge. Institutions for managing international 
public goods include international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol 
on emission reduction of greenhouse gases, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations. Public goods crossing 
national jurisdictional borders add a dimension to Samuelson’s (1954) general theory for 
public goods. Under the current international law, obligations may be imposed only on a 
sovereign state with its consent. Hence, multinational institutions and international 
agreements often have weak or even lack explicit control and enforcement mechanisms. 
Compliance with agreements is often hard to control and verify, and moreover, there are 
seldom explicit sanction mechanisms in these agreements. With this in mind, it is 
reasonable to address the question of whether these institutions work or not. 
In this paper, we address this question by evaluating two specific international 
environmental agreements: The 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur 
Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent, and The 1994 Oslo 
Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions. In the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, each 
signatory should reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by at least 30 per cent compared with 
the 1980 level “as soon as possible and at the latest by 1993” according to Article 2 in the   3
protocol.
2 The 1994 Oslo Protocol is a direct follow-up protocol of the 1985 Helsinki 
Protocol, but participation is not restricted to countries participating in the first sulphur 
protocol. The 1994 Oslo Protocol specifies different emission ceilings expressed as 
annual emission ceilings for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010. As both protocols are 
voluntary in compliance, they share many of the same characteristics as most institutions 
managing global public goods and commons. 
Even though there are contradictory results from studies evaluating international 
environmental agreements, most of the economics literature concludes that they “tend to 
codify Nash behaviour and, as such, do not present much of a co-operative gain” (Arce et 
al. 2001, p. 494).
3 As far as we know, the 1994 Oslo Protocol has not yet been evaluated 
by an econometric approach, but the 1985 Helsinki Protocol has undergone quantitative 
assessment. Levy (1993), Murdoch et al. (1997) and Helm and Sprinz (2000) find that the 
1985 Helsinki Protocol reduced sulphur emissions further than expected reductions 
without the protocol. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) criticizes these studies for failure 
to take into account the fact that ratification of the Protocol is not random but a result of a 
self-selection decision process. They find that the 1985 Helsinki Protocol has had no 
significant effect on sulphur emissions. 
To control for the self-selection process, we use programme evaluation methods, and 
difference-in-difference estimations in particular, to control for observed and unobserved 
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3 These arguments are often based on acceptance of the hypothesis that countries act according to the non-
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factors affecting emission levels.
4 Difference-in-difference estimation focuses on the 
difference in emissions before and after signing a specific protocol and compares it with 
this difference for non-signatory countries. Identification of the effect is obtained by 
repeated annual observations of emissions from signatories and non-signatories as a 
control group both before and after the signing date. We use a very flexible panel data 
model that allows for country-specific growth effects, and standard country and year 
effects. 
We expand on the econometric framework of Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) by 
introducing both the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo Protocol for reductions in 
sulphur emissions. In addition, we use a larger time span for analysis. Most importantly, 
we look at relative changes in emissions rather than absolute levels in the difference-in-
difference model. This is important in models with potential selection bias because we 
allow for both the level and yearly changes in emissions to be different for the different 
treatment groups prior to the signing period. In addition, difference-in-difference 
estimation methods rely on annual data and this may induce serial correlations in the 
variables. In particular, the variable in evaluation focus—signing an agreement—will be 
serial correlated. Overlooking this may, as demonstrated by Bertrand et al. (2003), 
introduce biased estimates of the standard errors. To overcome this bias, we follow 
Bertrand  et al. (2003) and use for inference the empirical distributions of estimated 
effects for placebo signatories. 
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Our results contradict those found in Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) for the 1985 
Helsinki Protocol. In a panel data regression model, where we include country and year 
dummies, and look at relative changes in emissions within the difference-in-difference 
framework, the effect of the Helsinki agreement in reducing sulphur emissions is 
estimated to be around three per cent per year, and the effect of the Oslo agreement is 
estimated to be around four per cent per year. These effects are significantly different 
from zero in most of our model specifications. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain the historical 
background for the two protocols. In section 3, we outline our econometric approach, 
emphasizing programme evaluation principles and methods for utilizing placebo 
protocols. In section 4, we present data, and in Section 5, we discuss the results. Finally, 
Section 6 brings some concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
Environmental problems that cross national borders require some form of international 
cooperation. The large number of multilateral agreements on environmental problems is 
evidence that this challenge is addressed. By 1994, according to Barrett (1994, p. 878), 
more than 100 multinational environmental agreements were in force. This includes 
agreements on marine fisheries and pollution, international rivers, lakes and groundwater, 
conservation of species, and protection of pet animals. Some of these agreements are 
regional, such as the Agreement Concerning the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, which  came into force in 1965 with five 
countries. Others are global agreements, such as the United Nations Framework   6
Convention on Climate Change adopted in 1992, where the number of signatories is 189 
countries. 
Most multinational environmental problems are characterized by conflict of interest 
and/or coordination problems. There is conflict of interest as each country may have an 
incentive to free-ride on emission reductions from other countries. As a consequence, 
countries that would benefit from cooperation end in a prisoners’ dilemma situation. Even 
without conflict of interest, environmental and management problems of other commons 
may be difficult to overcome as there may be problems with coordination. A government 
may find it hard to contribute without credible contributions from other governments. 
The conflict of interest and control problems may be partly solved as governments 
engage in repeated intergovernmental relations in managing environmental commons and 
other relations, such as EU integration, NATO enlargement, and international trade 
agreements. These relations may overcome incentives to free-ride. Ostrom (1990) argues, 
using numerous examples, that local communities handle incentives to free-ride by 
voluntary cooperation when supplying public goods. In the same manner, governments 
may manage to deal (partly) with incentives to free-ride. 
Success or failure of international agreements depends on participation and compliance 
incentives. A specific agreement can fail to incorporate all relevant countries that should 
have been part of the agreement. Depending on the group of participating countries, the 
agreement can also fail to implement efficient emission policies.   7
The 1979 Geneva Convention and its follow-up protocols 
For many European countries, most deposits of sulphur and nitrogen oxides are airborne 
from other countries. These air pollutants can be carried by winds for hundreds, even 
thousands, of kilometres before being deposited in soil or water. These pollutants cause 
damaging effects on fish stocks and forests, and cause health threats to people by 
reducing the air quality. Clearly, nitrogen and sulphur oxide emissions in one country 
create environmental and health consequences in other countries. 
To deal with these problems of air pollution, a group of European and North American 
countries agreed upon The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution. When marking its 25
th anniversary in 2004, the number of parties to the 
agreement was 49 including the European Union. The 1979 Geneva Convention was 
extended by eight follow-up protocols
5 that specify specific targets for abatements for the 
parties to the protocols. The first of these was The 1984 Geneva Protocol on Long-term 
Financing of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe.  This protocol has three main 
components: collection of emission data for sulphur and nitrogen oxide and other air 
pollutants, measurement of air and precipitation quality, and modelling of atmospheric 
dispersion.
6 The Protocol also requires mandatory contributions supplemented by 
voluntary contributions, for sharing the cost of financing the monitoring of emissions and 
the quality of specific air pollutants. The mandatory contribution is given as a percentage 
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of total cost. The protocol came into force on 28 January 1988, and by June 2004, it 
encompassed 41 parties. 
There are three follow-up protocols regulating sulphur emissions: The 1985 Helsinki 
Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 
30 per cent, The 1994 Oslo Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, and The 
1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Groundlevel 
Ozone. In the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, each signatory should reduce sulphur dioxide 
emission by at least 30 per cent compared with the 1980 level “as soon as possible and at 
the latest by 1993” according to Article 2 in the protocol.
7 It came into force on 2 
September 1987 and has 22 parties. The 1994 Oslo Protocol is a direct follow-up protocol 
of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, but participation is not restricted to countries participating 
in the first sulphur protocol. For example, Greece, Ireland, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom did not sign the 1985 Helsinki Protocol but did sign the 1994 Oslo Protocol. 
The 1994 Oslo Protocol specifies different emission ceilings expressed as annual 
emission ceilings for the years 2000, 2005 and 2010. It became effective on 5 August 
1995 with 25 parties. The 1999 Gothenburg Protocol sets emission ceilings on sulphur, 
nitrous oxides (NOX) and volatile organic compounds (VOC) as the other major air 
pollutants responsible for the formation of ground-level ozone and ammonia. It is, 
however, not yet in effect. 
Among the follow-up protocols, there are two specific protocols on NOX emissions: The 
1988 Sofia Protocol concerning the Control of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary 
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Fluxes, and the aforementioned 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. Finally, there are three 
protocols concerning other pollutants: The 1991 Geneva Protocol concerning the Control 
of Emission of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes, The 1998 
Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Metals, and The 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs). 
3. Empirical  modelling 
Our aim is to evaluate the effect of a specific agreement on the signatories’ sulphur 
emissions. In particularly, we investigate whether signatories reduce their emissions more 
than they would have done without this agreement. Clearly, reduction of emissions is a 
restricted measurement of success, and many agreements have other goals. For example, 
the 1994 Oslo Protocol on sulphur emissions also focuses on damage caused by the 
pollutants, as the deposition of oxidized sulphur should not exceed specified critical loads 
(see Appendix 2), and cost-efficient emission reduction. As we are focusing on emission 
reduction, we overlook success along other dimensions of a protocol. However, we 
believe that reduction in emissions is one of the key measurements of success. 
We measure the effect over a long time span, as the intention of these protocols is to 
change emission policy over a long period. In the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, the aim is to 
reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by at least 30 per cent as soon as possible but at the 
latest by 1993. Similar, the 1994 Oslo Protocol sets up specific reductions by the years 
2000, 2005 and 2010.   10
We model the emission process as a random growth model (see, for example Heckman 
and Hotz, 1989), and to formalize we define for year t = 0, 1, 2,…, T and country i = 1, 
2,…, N the following variables. 
it Y  = a country i’s natural logarithm of sulphur emissions in year t 
it X  = a vector of covariates such as GDP and population 
p T  = a set of years where protocol p may have an effect, where  {} T   2,...,   1,   0, Tp ⊆  





otherwise   0
    and     protocol   signed   country    if    1 p p
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The random growth model for county i at time t is given by: 
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1 1  for t = 1, 2,…, T, (1) 
where the parameters  i c  and  i g  are country fixed effects and country annual growth 
effects, respectively. The annual effects of the two protocols are captured by the 
parameters (
2 1,δ δ ). Differentiating the random growth model in (1) with respect to t, we 
obtain: 
it it it it i it v X D D g Y Δ + β Δ + δ + δ + = Δ
2 2 1 1   , (2) 
where Δ is the time difference operator, for example  1 − − = Δ it it it Y Y Y . The interpretation 
of the coefficients in the level model (1) and the difference model (2) is the same; 
however, the assumption about the error term is different. This will have consequences   11
for the estimation of the standard error of the coefficients in our model. In particular, 
model (1) is generally ridden with serial correlation (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002; 
Bertrand et al., 2003; Helland and Tabarrok, 2004). Both specifications are estimated 
using OLS with country-specific fixed effects. 
The treatment effect of protocol p at time  p T t ∈ , i.e., 
1 δ  and 
2 δ , is interpreted as an 
annual effect. The identifying assumptions for 
1 δ  and 
2 δ  to be causal effects are as 
follows. (i) The change over time in sulphur emissions in the contrafactual situation is the 




it t D Y E( ) 0 | = Δ
p
it it t D Y . (ii) Pre-
treatment relative change for the group of signatories is the same as it would have been 
without signing the protocol, i.e., there is no adjustment in the pre-signing period. Hence, 
as an estimator for the annual effect for protocol p we utilize: 
=
p δ  E( ) 1 | = Δ
p
it it t D Y – E( ) 0 | = Δ
p
it it t D Y , 
which is the difference-in-difference model for yearly changes in emissions. 
Serial correlation and randomized protocols 
As we remarked in the introduction, estimation of equation (1) by OLS is subject to a 
possible serial correlation. Clearly, as we model emissions using time differences ( it Y Δ ), 
we reduce the potential serial correlation in the dependent variable compared with 
estimating a model using the level of emissions ( it Y ) as the dependent variable. However, 
the treatment variables in themselves, 
p
it D , are highly correlated over time for a given   12
country. If country i signed protocol p in year t, it will also have signed the protocol in 
the years afterwards. This serial correlation will induce biased estimates of the standard 
errors of the estimated effects (
p δ ˆ ) (see Wooldridge, 2002; Bertrand et al., 2003). The 
direction of the bias depends on serial correlations in the error terms and the explanatory 
variables. In a simple model with one explanatory variable with a first-order serial 
correlation in the independent variable and a first-order correlation for the error term, the 
bias is downward if the serial correlation in the error term and independent variable are 
positive. The estimated standard errors are smaller than true standard errors in this case. 
If the first-order correlation in error terms is negative, the estimated standard errors are 
too large.
8 
To overcome the potential problem with serial correlation, we follow Bertrand et al. 
(2003) and use randomization inference by estimating the effect and standard deviation of 
placebo signatories. We expand the placebo framework used in the literature and suggest 
several different randomization strategies. In general, we generate placebo protocols P by 
randomly assigning a protocol by country and year, 
p
it P , and estimate the effects using 
OLS. 
it t it it it i it X P P g Y ε Δ + β Δ + γ + γ + = Δ '  
2 2 1 1  (3) 
We generate 1000 random placebo protocols, and generate the distributions of 
p γ  
denoted by  (.) G
p  for p = 1, 2. Assuming the model is correctly specified, the mean of the 
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distribution is zero because randomly choosing protocols should have no effect on 
emissions. The average number of randomly drawn country-years is the same as the 
number in the actual sample signing the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo 
Protocol.
9 We perform 1000 independent draws of (
2 1, it it P P ). For each draw, we run the 
regression in equation (3). 
The randomization of placebo protocols is drawn in four different ways depending on 
assumptions about both the data-generating process and the structural properties of the 
parameters in the model. (i) We assume that the effect of a protocol, i.e., the parameter 
p γ ,  is independent of time. This assumption means that the effect of the protocol in the 
first year is the same whether the protocol started in 1970 or in 1990.
10 We label this 
assumption that the effect is structural or path independent. In the randomization 
algorithm, a placebo protocol is drawn randomly for each country-year in the whole 
observation period 1961–2002 such as the average country-years active placebo protocols 
are the same as in the actual sample.  For example, the first drawn placebo protocol may 
be the year 1961 for a specific country but not the following year for the same country.  
(ii) We still assume that the effect is structural. However, we restrict the placebo 
protocols to be in place in the same consecutive number of years as the actual protocol. 
Each year we randomly draw a country to be a part of a placebo protocol or not. If a 
country is drawn to be part of the placebo protocol, it will be part of the protocol for 
succeeding years such that the total average number of years is the same as that for the 
                                                 
9 In our data there are in total 1,038 country-year observations. Out of these, there are 123 country-years 
where the 1985 Helsinki Protocol’s indicator  Dit = 1, and 158 country-years for the 1994 Oslo Protocol.   
10 In addition, we assume that the effect is the same from the first to the second year and from the second to 
the third year, etc.; i.e., constant over time.   14
observed 1985 Helsinki Protocol and 1994 Oslo Protocol. (iii) We assume that the effect 
is restricted to the actual period of the protocols, i.e., the parameter  p γ  is only defined in 
the actual protocol period, Tp. This assumption, we take to mean, as the effect is path 
dependent and not a structural phenomenon. In the randomization algorithm, a placebo 
protocol is drawn randomly for each  p T t ∈ . This implies that a country may be in a 
placebo protocol p in the first year Tp but may not be in the second year. (iv)  Finally, we 
assume that the effect is restricted to the actual signatory period as in (iii), and that the 
effect of protocol p is defined for the whole period Tp. A placebo protocol is drawn 
randomly for the whole period Tp. This means that if a country is drawn to be in a placebo 
protocol the first year in the actual protocol period Tp, the protocol indicator variable,  it P , 
is constant for the rest of the actual period Tp. 
Even though we report standard errors for all four randomization strategies, they differ in 
the assumption about the data-generation process and whether our parameters are 
assumed to be structural or not. Randomization strategy (iv) replicates our data perfectly 
except that the protocol country is randomly drawn and the placebo effect is restricted to 
an actual period. However, the time dimension is irrelevant if the effect of a protocol is a 
structural parameter, meaning that the effect is not time dependent and we allow for it to 
be in other periods as well. In this case, we draw placebo protocols for the entire 
observation period (1960–2002) as in randomization strategies (i) and (ii). In (ii), we 
assume that the protocol period is fixed, which is not the case in (i). 
To test the null hypothesis of no effect of signing a protocol, we check whether the 
estimate of 
p δ  from equation (2) lies in the distribution  (.) G
p . For example, to form a   15
two-level test at the five per cent level, we find 
p γ  at 2.5 per cent of the lower and upper 
tail of the distribution. If our estimate of 
p δ  is inside the interval defined by the two 
points, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no-effect. If it lies outside this interval, we 
reject the null hypothesis of no-effect. As we do not expect the effect of protocols to be 
counterproductive, i.e., the estimate of 
p δ  to be positive (increased emissions), we also 
use a one-sided test. Formally, we define the null hypothesis as  0
p ≥ δ  with alternative 
hypothesis  0
p < δ . 
4. Data 
Our analysis of the sulphur protocols utilizes data from 30 European countries in the 
period 1960–2002. All countries in the data set have signed and ratified the 1970 Geneva 
Convention. We include a country as a “signatory” of a protocol if it had both signed and 
ratified the particular protocol. The ratification has to be in 1993 for The 1985 Helsinki 
Protocol and in 2002 for the 1994 Oslo Protocol. Of these 30 countries, 18 signed the 
1985 Helsinki Protocol, 19 signed the 1994 Oslo Protocol, 13 signed both protocols, and 
six signed neither of these protocols (see Table 1). The 1985 Helsinki Protocol was 
signed on 9 July in 1985, and we assume that the period of potential effect is 1986–93. 
The 1994 Oslo Protocol was signed on 14 June in 1994, and we assume that the effect is 
from 1995 until 2002. 
(Table 1 about here)   16
Data on sulphur emissions are based on Stern (2006), which is again based on EMEP’s 
webpage.
11 For some additional data, we also use EMEP’s webpage. The population and 
gross domestic products (GDP) data are taken from PENN World Table version 6.2, 
Heston  et al. (2006). The political changes in Europe might have had an effect on 
emissions behaviour. Therefore, we include a control dummy variable for the former 
communist countries of Eastern Europe, reflecting the transition process. We use 1991 as 
the first transition year, indicating post-transition with a dummy. For a more detailed 
description of the data, see Appendix A. 
(Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
Figures 1 and 2 show sulphur emissions per capita, GDP per capita, and sulphur 
emissions per GDP dollar for the signatories of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the group 
of control countries in the period 1960–2002 (Figure 1), and the signatories of the 1995 
Oslo Protocol and the control group (Figure 2). The GDP per capita is increasing for both 
signatories and the control group, but the level of GDP per capita is lower for the 
controls. The control groups use sulphur more intensively in their economies as sulphur 
emissions per GDP are higher than the signatories of the two protocols. Sulphur 
emissions increased for all countries from 1960 until at least 1975. From the beginning of 
the 1980s, when discussions of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol began, most countries had 
already started to reduce the level of sulphur emissions. This decline is also confirmed by 
Figure 3, which shows median relative emission changes over time for the two protocols. 
                                                 
11 The Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air 
Pollutants in Europe (the EMEP programme) monitors emissions regulated by the 1979 Geneva 
Convention. The data are from http://www.emep.int/.   17
For both protocols, the annual growth for the median signatory country is below that for 
the median non-signatory countries in the protocol periods, but even though the picture 
for pre-protocols is somewhat mixed, it seems as though annual growth for median 
signatory countries is below that for the median non-signatory countries. Summing up, 
the raw data seem to indicate that both protocols worked. For more accurate statements, 
we now turn to the econometric analyses. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
5.  Results and analyses 
The results from the regression model given in differentiated form in equation (2) are 
given in Table 2 below. Except for the participation and transition country dummies, the 
variables are in logarithm and time differenced; thus, their coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities. Our preferred specification of the model includes controls for both year 
effects and country-specific growth effects in the differentiated model. We also include 
the results from a regression with no year and country growth effects (model I in Table 
2), and a regression model where we include year effects but not country-specific growth 
effects (model II in Table 2). It turns out that allowing for country-specific growth effects 
in emissions is important, because countries vary substantially in emission trajectories. 
Thus, in the discussion, we will focus on model III in Table 2, because this offers the 
most flexible modelling of changes in emissions over time. 
From Table 2, model III, we see that a one per cent increase in gross domestic product 
will increase emissions by 0.45 per cent. The population variable is not significantly   18
different from zero in our preferred model (model III). In the former communist countries 
in Eastern Europe, the annual relative change in emissions is between minus three and 
four per cent annually. However, this effect is not statistically different from zero in 
model III where we allow for country-specific growth effects. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Turning to the main variables of this paper, we see that, without controlling for time and 
country effects (model I in Table 2), the estimated annual effect of the 1985 Helsinki 
Protocol in the period 1986–1994 is –0.064, corresponding to a 6.4 per cent annual 
reduction in emissions. The estimated effect of the 1994 Oslo Protocol is an 8.4 per cent 
annual reduction in emissions. The estimated robust standard errors are 0.011 for the 
Helsinki and the Oslo estimates, and thus both are highly significant. 
Model III in Table 2 includes both a common yearly growth rate and a country-specific 
yearly growth rate in emissions independent of the protocol variables, and is our 
preferred model. We see that the effect of the protocols is reduced to 3.1 per cent for the 
Helsinki Protocol and 4.0 for the Oslo Protocol. The robust standard errors for these 
estimates are 0.021 and 0.025 respectively. Thus, the coefficient estimates are not 
significant at the 10 per cent level for a two-sided test. 
To investigate the serial correlation for the dependent variable, we estimate serial 
correlations from regressions on time differences of emissions ( it tY Δ ) controlling for 
covariates ( it tX Δ ) from the model given by equation (2). The serial correlation 
coefficients are obtained by a regression of the residuals on the corresponding lagged   19
residuals. The estimated serial correlation coefficients are small in the model where we 
look at yearly changes in emissions within the difference-in-difference model (see 
Appendix B). The first-order serial correlation coefficients are around –0.03 in Table B2, 
and they are not significantly different from zero. The correlation coefficients between 
the residual and lagged values of the residuals are also very small (see Table B.3). 
The serial correlation coefficients in Table B.2 are considerably smaller than similar 
correlation coefficients obtained by regression on the corresponding level model usually 
used in the literature, i.e., regression of emission ( ) it Y  controlling for covariates ( ) Xit , 
and year and country dummies (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). This model is estimated 
from equation (1) above. The estimated first-order coefficients are around 0.8 and 
strongly significant. All this demonstrates that serial correlations related to the dependent 
variable are reduced when we use time differences in logarithmic emissions and 
covariates as variables instead of level of emissions and level of covariates. The standard 
error from the level model is much smaller than the standard error for the difference 
model. This is according to theory. Positive serial correlation in the error term will cause 
standard errors to be understated, and this will be exaggerated if we also have serial 
correlation in the independent variables (see Helland and Tabarrok, 2004). The problem 
with serial correlation is much smaller for the difference model given in equation (2) 
compared to the level model in equation (1). 
We estimate the standard errors for the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols in case of serial 
correlation in the dependent and/or independent variables using placebo protocols. The 
empirical distributions of the effect of the placebo protocols are given in Figure 4 for the   20
Helsinki Protocol and in Figure 5 for the Oslo Protocol. As expected, the placebo effects 
are normally distributed with mean value zero. The standard errors for the four different 
randomization strategies are given in Table 3 for the Helsinki Protocol and the Oslo 
Protocol. 
The standard errors vary slightly depending on our randomization strategy. The standard 
error increases monotonically from specification (i) to specification (iv) (see Table 3 and 
Figures 4 and 5). In addition, we find that the standard errors are smaller in the placebo 
experiments compared with the robust standard errors as reported in Table 2, except for 
the standard error for the Oslo Protocol using randomization strategy (iv). 
The estimated standard errors for the Helsinki Protocol and the Oslo Protocol using 
randomization strategy (i) are 0.013 and 0.011, respectively. Thus, the estimated yearly 
effects of both protocols are significantly different from zero at the one per cent level. If 
we use randomization strategy (ii), the estimated standard errors are 0.016 and 0.014 for 
both the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols, respectively. Thus, the Helsinki Protocol is 
significant at the 10 per cent level, while the Oslo Protocol is significant at the five per 
cent level. The same conclusion is reached using randomization strategy (iii), where the 
estimated standard error for both protocols is 0.018. The estimated effect for the Helsinki 
Protocol using randomization strategies (ii) and (iii) is significant at the five per cent 
level for a one-sided test, while the Oslo Protocol is significant at the one per cent level 
for a one-sided test. Lastly, the estimated standard errors from strategy (iv) are 0.019 and 
0.031 for the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols, respectively. Thus, the estimated coefficients 
(
2 1 ˆ , ˆ δ δ ) are not significantly different from zero in this case.   21
As we mentioned earlier, we do not expect the effect of protocols to be 
counterproductive, i.e., the estimate of 
p δ  to be positive (increased emissions). Thus, we 
also use a one-sided test. Formally, we define the null hypothesis as  0
p ≥ δ  with 
alternative hypothesis  0
p < δ . However, in a one-tailed test (not reported here), both 
protocols are significant at the 10 per cent level for all six standard errors. 
(Figures 4 and 5 about here) 
(Table 3 about here) 
6. Concluding  remarks 
Our opening question was whether voluntary multinational environmental agreements 
succeed in reaching their aims. Based on our analysis of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and 
the 1995 Oslo Protocol on sulphur emissions, our answer to this question is “yes” 
conditional on fundamental assumptions in our analysis. Our analysis utilizes panel data 
from 30 European countries for the period 1960–2002. We divide these countries into 
“participants” and “non-participants”, i.e., those that did and those that did not ratify the 
specific protocol. We use a difference-in-difference estimator that focuses on differences 
in emissions before and after signing a specific protocol and comparing this with the 
differences for non-participating countries. We find that the annual reduction in 
emissions due to the Helsinki Protocol is three per cent, and four per cent for the 1995 
Oslo Protocol. To overcome the problem of biased standard errors, we follow Bertrand et 
al. (2003) and compute the difference-in-difference estimates for 1000 randomly   22
generated placebo protocols. We include several different randomization strategies 
depending on the data-generating process and assumptions about the parameters in our 
model. We use the empirical distribution of placebo effects to test whether the estimated 
effects are significantly different from zero. The estimated effects are significant in some 
of our models, but not robust to different randomization strategies for placebo protocols. 
Thus, even though the annual effects of the two protocols in terms of reduced sulphur 
emissions are estimated at three per cent for the Helsinki Protocol and four per cent for 
the Oslo Protocol, the estimated standard errors indicate that a definitive conclusion about 
the effectiveness of these protocols cannot be reached. 
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Table 1. Participating countries in the protocols and controls. 
Helsinki & Oslo  Helsinki  Oslo  None 
Austria   Bulgaria  Czech Republic, 1991–02  Iceland 
Belgium Russia,  1990 Greece  Poland 
Denmark USSR,  1990  Ireland  Portugal 
Finland  West Germany, 1960–89  Slovakia, 1991–02  Romania 
France  East Germany, 1970–89  Spain  Turkey 
Hungary   United  Kingdom   
Italia      
Germany, 1990–2002       
Luxemburg      
Netherlands      
Norway      
Sweden      
Switzerland        27
Table 2. Estimate of relative changes in emissions using panel data (robust standard error 
in parenthesis). 
Dependent variable: Annual change in log emission 


















     






     






     






     
Year effects  No  F = 3.47***  F = 3.43*** 
     
Country growth effects ( i g )  No No  F  =  3.04*** 







     
R-square 0.134  0.227  0.269 
N        1,038        1,038        1,038 
Notes 
(1) Dependent variable: First-order differences in log emission. 
(2) All independent variables are in first-order difference in logarithms except dummy variables. 
(3) Significant levels two-tailed test: * 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 1 per cent based on robust standard 
errors.   28
Table 3. Estimated effects and different standard errors (in percentages). 
Protocols:   THE 1995 HELSINKI   THE 1994 OSLO  
Actual protocol period   1986–1993  1995–2002 
    
Estimated annual effect (%)  –3.1  –4.0 
Estimated standard errors   2.0  2.5 
Robust standard errors  2.1  2.5 
    
Standard errors from distribution of effects of 
placebo protocols for different assumptions:  
  
Structural effect parameter:     
Annual draw  1.3***  1.1***  
Period draw  1.6*  1.4** 
    
Effect parameter restricted to actual protocol 
period: 
  
Annual draw  1.8*  1.8** 
Period draw   1.9  3.1 
    
Notes 
(1) Significant levels two-tailed test: * 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 1 per cent. 
(2) Period draw means that a country is randomly drawn to participate in a placebo protocol for a period 
with length as actual protocol period.   29
Figure 1. Mean values for sulphur emissions per capita, GDP (1996 US dollars), and 
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Figure 2. Mean values for sulphur emissions per capita, GDP per capita, and sulphur 
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Figure 3. Median annual change in log (emissions) for signatories of the 1985 Helsinki 
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Figure 4. Distribution of effects of placebo protocols for the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and 
the estimated effect (vertical line) from Model III in Table 2 for different assumptions 
about the structural draw and the draw. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of effects of placebo protocols for the 1994 Oslo Protocol and the 
estimated effect (vertical line) from Model III in Table 2 for different assumptions about 
the structural draw and the draw. 
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Appendix A. Data description 
 
Countries. All countries signed and ratified The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range 
Trans-boundary Air Pollution. Since the 1979 Geneva Convention, the political map of 
Europe has changed. Before the reunification of Germany in 1990, we use West Germany 
1960–1989 and East Germany 1970–1989. For the reunified Germany, we use data from 
1990–2002. On 1 January 1993, Czechoslovakia underwent a “velvet divorce” into its 
two national components, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The two new states inherited 
the former state responsibilities related to the 1978 Geneva Convention and its follow-up 
protocols. We use 1960–1990 data for Czechoslovakia and for the Czech and Slovak 
republics for 1991–2002. In December 1991, the USSR splintered into Russia and 14 
other independent republics. We use data for the USSR for 1960–1990 and for Russia for 
1990–2002. 
 
Signatories of the protocols. We define a country as a signatory of The 1985 Helsinki 
Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at 
least 30 per cent if the country signed the protocol and ratified it in 1993. Both Czech and 
Slovak Republics ratified the protocol in 1993, but Czechoslovakia did not sign. Here we 
classify Czechoslovakia and its two separated countries as non-signatories of the 1985 
Helsinki Protocol. We define a country as a signatory of The 1994 Oslo Protocol on 
Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions if it signed the protocol and ratified it in 2002. 
Sulphur emissions data are from Stern (2006). For 1980–2001, the data are available 
from the EMEP web site (www.emep.in). Additional data for 1970–1980 are from earlier 
OECD statistics from Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Stern interpolates data 
where necessary using Streets and ASL data to derive consistent data. Furthermore, Stern 
estimates data from other sources for the period 1960–1970 and for non-OECD countries 
in the period 1990–1980.   35
For the year 2002, we supplement Stern’s data from EMEP (www.emep.in). For Russia 
1990–2002, we use EMEP expert emissions predictions and we approximate for the 
missing years of 1991–1994. 
Population data are from PENN World Table Version 6.2 (Heston et al. (2006), variable 
population). For East and West Germany, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia during this 
time, we use PENN World Table Version 5.6. 
Gross domestic product is also from PENN World Table Version 6.2 (Heston et al. 
(2006), We use real GDP per capita in 1996 dollars (variable RGDPCH[16].) For 
Bulgaria 1980–1990, Czechoslovakia 1960–1990, East Germany 1970–1989, West 
Germany 1950–1992, and the USSR 1960–1990, we use GDP per capita from PENN 
World Table Version 5.6. To get consistent data between the two GDP per capita 
numbers, we regress the GDP per capita from PENN World Table 6.2 on GDP per capita 
PENN World table version 5.6 controlling for countries and years, and use the predicted 
GDP per capita in 1996 dollars.   36
Appendix B. Residual analysis for differential model 
Table B.1. Regression model for loge emissions, differential model. 
Dependent variable: Annual change in loge emissions 
  Coefficient  Robust standard error   Standard error 
Helsinki 1986–1993  –0.031  0.021  0.020 
Oslo 1995–2002  –0.040  0.025  0.025 
Gross Domestic Product  0.446**  0.188  0.131 
Population –0.530  1.315  1.251 
Transition = 1 after 1990  –0.037  0.023  0.029 
Year effects        F = 3.43***     
Country growth effects ( i g )  F = 3.04***     
Constant 0.012  0.027  0.034 
R-square 0.269     
N         1,038     
Note: Explanatory variables are annual change in logarithms. Significant levels two-tailed test: * 10 per 
cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 1 per cent based on robust standard errors. 
Table B.2. Analyses of serial correlations for differential models. 
Residual (t)  I  II  III  IV  V 




























Residual (t–5)          –0.041 
(0.041) 
N 1,008  978  948  918    888 
Note: Significant levels two-tailed test: * 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 1 per cent. 
Table B.3. Correlation matrix for residuals. 
 Res(t)    Res(t–1)  Res(t–2)  Res(t–3)  Res(t–4) 
Res(t)  1.000      
Res(t–1) –0.031 1.000       
Res(t–2) 0.046  –0.046  1.000    
Res(t–3) –0.067 0.058  –0.061 1.000   
Res(t–4) –0.084  –0.066 0.059  –0.046 1.000 
Res(t–5)  –0.040 –0.076 –0.065  0.051 –0.046   37
Appendix C. Residual analysis for level model 
Table C.1. Regression model for log emissions, level model. 
Log emission   Coefficient  Robust Stand. Error 
(Helsinki 1986–1993)*years since 1986  –0.030***  0.006 
(Oslo 1995–2002)*years since 1995  –0.084***  0.013 
Log GDP  0.495***  0.010 
Log Population  –1.172**  0.584 
(Transition)*Years since Transition   –0.049***  0.010 
Years since 1960  –0.056***  0.005 
Year dummies (1960–2002)  Included***   
Country dummies (30 countries)  Included***   
Interaction term year and country  Included***   
N 1,068   
R-squared 0.988   
Note: Significant levels two-tailed test: * 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 1 per cent. 
Table C.2. Analyses of serial correlation for level model. 
Residual (t)  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 




























Residual (t–5)          –0.017 
(0.033) 
N 1,038  1,008  978  948  918 
Note: Significant levels two-tailed test: * 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 1 per cent. 
Table C.3. Correlation matrix for residuals. 
 Res(t)    Res(t–1)  Res(t–2)  Res(t–3)  Res(t–4) 
Res(t)  1.00      
Res(t–1) 0.79 1.00       
Res(t–2) 0.59 0.78 1.00     
Res(t–3) 0.38 0.59 0.77 1.00   
Res(t–4) 0.20 0.38 0.59 0.78 1.00 
Res(t–5) 0.08 0.21 0.38 0.60 0.79 
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